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Abstract—Food production and transport infrastructure play  
a  large  role  in  the  outcome  of  a  military  campaign  and  the  
results of failure can have a profound effect on the whole state.  
Yet  these  are  areas  often  poorly  covered  by  contemporary  
sources.  The  Medieval  Warfare  on  the  Grid  project  is  using  
agent-based modelling to produce quantitative data to examine  
the  mechanisms  required  to  move  armies  across  a  
pre-industrial landscape.  Though focused on the march of the  
Byzantine  army  to  the  Battle  of  Manzikert  in  AD1071,  the  
results  can  improve  our  understanding  of  the  logistical  
challenges faced by armies in other periods and places. The use  
of  quantitative  data  from  later  sources  provides  valuable  
assistance to both design and validation of the models.
I. INTRODUCTION
lthough  simulation  studies have been  applied within 
historical studies for some considerable time there has 
been a noted increased level of interest in agent-based mod-
elling in recent years [1], In part this may be a simple reac-
tion  to the  availability of appropriate  technology for such 
work although these developments have taken place in the 
context of an increasing awareness of the potential of simu-
lations  to answer  novel questions  that  traditional  studies 
are not well placed to resolve and, perhaps, within areas of 
study where there is an absence of traditional data for con-
crete analysis and  where the presumption of the action of 
unseen agents may make such studies essential if we are to 
make sense of past behavioural data. 
A
The choice to undertake such studies should, therefore, be 
based upon a number of questions including whether  such 
techniques are appropriate for simulation and also whether 
data (direct or proxy) is available to support simulations of 
events which are poorly recorded or where there is is no dir-
ect parallel or proxy data to provide basic behavioural rules 
for simulation.  This lack of data  is particularly noticeable 
during the validation of models.  For that reason it is essen-
tial  that  simulation  studies are  explicit  about  why studies 
are undertaken and what their significance is to the chosen 
subjects but also how behavioural  rules are  developed for 
modelling purposes. 
This paper provides an account of the Medieval Warfare 
on  the  Grid  project  (MWGrid)  project  and  outlines  how 
some of  the data used by the project were developed during 
the  period  of research.   Although  the  full  project  will  be 
published during  2015 the need to promote debate on the 
nature of such projects is of value to identify areas of best 
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practice and also to avoid those situations in which model-
ling appears to be an aim in itself and, consequently, where 
disciplinary goals are not well developed and the content of 
the simulations is not well suited to providing substantive 
historical research outputs.
Contemporary accounts of historical  military campaigns 
traditionally focus on battles and personalities. If we are to 
believe the accounts of the participants,  it is on the battle-
field  that  heroic  deeds are  performed,  commanders  show 
their  genius and questions of power are decided. It is this 
bias within  the historical  record that  gives the impression 
that  the  operations  which  precede  the  battle  are  simple, 
mundane and unimportant. Yet it is the raising, moving and 
feeding of armies that occupies the resources of a state and 
provides a large drain on incoming taxes. Food production 
and transport infrastructure play a large role in the outcome 
of a military campaign and the results of failure can have a 
profound effect on the whole state. Gaps in the historical re-
cord regarding  these systems are therefore both important 
and noticeable. The lack of historical detail regarding milit -
ary support infrastructure means that other sources of data 
must be used in  order  to examine the ways in  which pre-
modern  states  moved  and  fed  their  armies.  Quantitative 
data, so often ignored in favour of qualitative details, is re-
quired in order to establish the limits of what is possible un-
der certain circumstances.
The  MWGrid  project  [2],  [3] has  been  simulating  the 
march of the Byzantine army across Anatolia to the Battle 
of  Manzikert  in  AD1071.  It  uses  agent-based  modelling 
(ABM) to simulate the  movement  and  supply of an  army 
with varying sizes, compositions, types of organisation and 
distances covered. This paper describes the organisation and 
aims of one set of these models, those simulating a single 
day's march of an army. The initial project design called for 
a single model to simulate the whole march across Anatolia 
in  one  single  run.  This  was  to  explore  the  interrelation 
between settlement,  transport  infrastructure,  army size and 
composition and the provision and transport  of equipment 
and food. A single day's march  became the main  focus of 
the MWGrid modelling effort when it was realised that the 
number of variables needed to be drastically reduced in or-
der to properly explore the parameter space. The models de-
tailed here focus on the way that small details in organisa-
tion affect the army's overall speed, noting how this would 
affect the supply situation. Further models will build on this 
work to expand the scope of the project. 
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The results of these models show a more complex situ-
ation regarding  the organisation of the army's march  than  
that depicted in contemporary accounts. Using the details of 
eyewitnesses combined with other Byzantine military writ-
ing  and  more  modern  data,  the  MWGrid  models  seek to 
create quantitative data that can be combined with the qual-
itative data in the written sources in order to provide para-
meters in which the campaign can be framed.
Not  only do the  historical  sources  not  tell  us  how the 
army moved or was fed, they give no indication of what was 
possible  within  the  medieval  period.  However  there  are 
fixed  points  from which  we may anchor  any  model  that  
seeks to investigate these problems. Terrain, human and an-
imal movements speed, calorie consumption and the physic-
al  size  of  the  army's  participants  and  equipment  can  be 
plausibly modelled based on modern or historical data. Sim-
ulation  can  then  test  unknowns  such  as  organisation  and 
army size  and  composition  in  order  to provide minimum 
and maximum values to some of the many variables associ-
ated with an army on the march.  This gives us a range of 
possibility within which to reframe the historical debate re-
garding how the Byzantine army moved and fed itself. This 
also allows us to attempt to assess the effects of the army on 
the communities through which it travelled.
II. PROBLEMS
In  AD1071,  the  Byzantine  Emperor,  Romanos IV Dio-
genes, led an army from Constantinople towards the south-
eastern corner of what is now the modern state of Turkey. It  
formed an attempt to engage and decisively beat the Seljuk 
Turk  nomads  who  had  been  raiding  Byzantine  Anatolia 
since the middle of the 11th century. Romanos was confron-
ted by the Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan at the fortress of Man-
zikert, just north of Lake Van. The defeat of the Byzantine 
army at the Battle of Manzikert and the subsequent period 
of civil war that followed has been described as “the most 
decisive disaster in  Byzantine history”[4]. From this point 
on the Byzantines never exerted control over the whole of 
Anatolia and the Turkic people were never driven out.
Considering the importance of the event and the number 
of historians, both contemporary and subsequent, who have 
described and  commented on the events of the battle,  the 
lack  of  reliable  quantitative  data  is  profound.  Byzantine 
sources give no numbers for the size of the army at all. Ar-
abic  and  Armenian  sources  give  figures  which  are  con-
sidered by modern historians to be exaggerated to emphas-
ise the scale of the Seljuk victory. More broadly, the logistic-
al mechanisms by which the Byzantine Empire could move 
an  army  “more  numerous  than  the  sands  of the  sea”[5] 
across a landscape with limited transport infrastructure and 
occasionally scarce  food resources  are  barely described at 
all. This lack of supporting data poses problems not just for 
the  design  of an  ABM but also for  the  validation  of any 
ABM produced.  There  are,  however, some starting  points 
that  can  be plausibly assumed.  The terrain  of Anatolia  is 
largely the same now as in the 11th century, in elevation al-
though possibly not in  the type of transport  infrastructure 
and vegetative cover. Humans and horses take up roughly 
the same amount  of space and  move at  roughly the same 
speed now as they did then so there is a solid base on which 
to build a crowding model. It can be assumed that  the hu-
man body burns calories as a result of work done in much 
the same way.
III. THE DAY'S MARCH MODELS
There are many factors involved with moving an  army, 
including availability of resources, number of participants,  
proportion of cavalry and infantry, number of baggage an-
imals etc. Some of these factors are interdependent, for in-
stance the number of baggage animals required depends on 
the  size  and  composition  of  the  army  and  the  distance 
between resupply locations[6]. Computer simulation can be 
used to model some of these factors and provide parameters  
within  which  the historical  debate can  be framed.  ABM's 
architecture of autonomous agents moving and interacting 
within  an  environment  of resources seems an  appropriate 
method of simulating the actions taken by an army on the  
march.
A series of scenarios have been run, each set focussing on 
a single aspect of the march. This is an attempt to explore 
the parameter  space as fully as possible. The problems of 
using models to extract the maximum useful data while be-
ing able to perform the modelling in a useful time are well 
known.  As a point  of comparison,  a  day's march  for 100 
agents takes around 90 seconds to run.  The same scenario 
for 10,000 agents takes around 90 minutes and for 40,000 
agents it takes around 90 hours.
A. Size and distance
 An army consisting of homogeneous agents is marched 
from one day's camp to the next. These camps are at a vari-
ety of distances between 10km – 30km. Three sizes of army 
are used: 101 agents, 10,001 agents and 40,001 agents. The 
extra agent represents the structure in the model in which 1 
main  route planning  agent  heads  the  column  and  squads 
featuring  regular  numbers  of  soldiers  follow in  order  of 
march.
B. Composition
Cavalry are added to the army in varying percentages in 
order to assess the effect this has on overall army speed and  
arrival  time. Cavalry agents differ from infantry agents in 
that they move faster (4mph as opposed to the 3mph of in-
fantry agents)  and  occupy more  space in  an  environment 
cell.
C. Variable cavalry speed
Furse  [7] suggests that  cavalry spend part  of the march 
on the trot, part walking and part being led by their riders.  
This ensures the horses are well exercised but don't become 
fatigued. This is implemented in the model in order to as-
sess its effect on arrival time.
D. Resting
Periodic resting on the march is recommended in the 19 th 
century literature. This not only gives soldiers the opportun-
ity to drink or release water but also operates as a mechan-
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ism  to close up  an  army column  that  has  a  tendency to 
elongate over time. A certain part of the rest period can be 
used to close up the gap on the unit in front if it has moved 
too  far  ahead.  The  effect  this  has  on  arrival  time  and 
column length is assessed.
E. Day length
Night marching is to be avoided where possible. For this 
reason the models are set up to only simulate the length of 
time corresponding  to the  amount  of daylight.  The Man-
zikert  campaign  ran  from early March  to  August  and  so 
would have seen a variety of lengths of daylight in each day. 
The effects of this are modelled.
F. Splitting into columns
One method of increasing the 'bandwidth' of the army is 
to split  the force into separate  columns who travel  to the 
same destination via different routes. This is especially pre-
valent with the increased army sizes of the Napoleonic era 
but can provide benefits for armies of the proposed size of 
the Byzantine army at Manzikert. The benefits include hav-
ing more soldiers on the march at the same time. However, 
there can only be one optimal route, soldiers sent via altern -
ative routes will either have a longer or harder march. Split -
ting  the army into 2 or  3  columns  is  compared  to single 
column marching.
G. Baggage
It is clear from both Byzantine and more modern sources 
that  the organisation  of baggage was rarely simple.  A tri -
partite  division of the baggage animals  is often suggested 
where each squad has its own baggage animal for frequently 
used items with a unit baggage train for less frequently used 
items and  an  army baggage train  for reserves of supplies 
and siege equipment. The MWGrid ABM has the ability to 
add baggage animals in a variety of organisational schemes 
and compare the effects on both equipment carrying ability 
and overall army speed.
H. Terrain
 Terrain affects route planning, resulting in longer travel-
ling time and more calories burned. The movement of the 
army would have depended on existing routes which them-
selves would have depended on a variety of factors. Unfor-
tunately there is not enough reliable data on Byzantine road 
systems to produce a plausible transport  infrastructure.  We 
also lack data  such as land  use and  the location of water 
courses  in  order  to  factor  in  the  effects  that  these  un-
doubtedly had on route planning. The best we can do is take 
into account the factors we can simulate plausibly, namely 
terrain and its effects on calorie consumption. For this reas-
on, the route planner  tries to take the shortest route while 
avoiding steep inclines. The degree to which it tries to avoid 
steep climbs varies based on the ABMs parameters and the 
effects of these parameters is explored in these scenarios.
I. Cumulative effects
 Although  it  is  not  yet  practical  to  model  every  days 
march of the Manzikert campaign consecutively as the cam-
paign took around 6 months and some models take longer 
to simulate than the corresponding march took to complete. 
Nevertheless, by
J.
K. The Manzikert campaign
The only real  method of validating the model via direct 
comparison to contemporary accounts is to see if the army 
as modelled would be able to travel over 700 miles across 
Anatolia from Constantinople to Manzikert within the time 
provided.  Representative  samples  of  days  marches  using 
plausible historical army sizes at various points along a hy-
pothetical route are used to determine whether the 6 months 
of the actual  campaign  are possible for the army as mod-
elled.  The army itself would have been subject to various 
delays for a variety of reasons, unmodelled within the ABM 
and so we would expect the model to outperform reality. If 
that is not the case, if the modelled army would have been 
unlikely to be able to reach Manzikert  within  the time re-
corded by historical accounts then it is a sign that the model 
may be wrong enough to not be useful. If the model does 
outperform the actual  army that  does not  of course prove 
that the army moved itself as modelled.
The scenarios described above represent over 100 differ-
ent  runs  of the  simulation  requiring  a  processing  time of 
over 1,000 hours. Even so there are combinations of ABM 
parameters  that  have  not  been  modelled.  The  parameter 
space  is  just  too large  to  sensibly explore  all  of it.  This 
presents  a  problem  within  historical  ABMs  in  general 
where there are few known points with which to anchor a 
model  and  too many variables  with  too great  a  range  to 
completely explore the possible combinations.
IV. VALIDATION
Validation can be problematic when dealing with histor-
ical  ABMs.  This  is  certainly  the  case  with  the  MWGrid 
models, where comparative data is scarce. The length of the 
campaign  as  a  whole is  known but  the  behaviour  of the 
army on a day's march  and the way in  which the various 
factors interrelate are almost complete unknowns. Historical 
records can produce bits of information that can be used to 
calibrate the models, however contemporary accounts of the 
Manzikert  campaign  are  unhelpful.  Byzantine  military 
treatises exist from the 10th century but these are often light 
on the actual  quantitative data required to compare to the 
output of an ABM. Quantitative data from similar situations 
can be found  from other sources. However, the 19th century 
saw the  publication  of a  number  of military manuals  and 
memoirs,  some of which  contain  detailed  descriptions  of 
military manoeuvres under similar circumstances and of the 
same scale as the Manzikert campaign.
The late 18th century and early 19th century was a period 
in which military writing flourished along with the access-
ibility of written publications.  The early 18th  century saw 
the hugely influential writings of Clausewitz [8] and Jomini 
[9] but higher  standards  of literacy and  lower  publishing 
costs subsequently ensured an audience for the writings of 
veterans of the wars of the mid to late 18th century. There 
were not only personal memoirs written of wars in Europe 
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and the Americas e.g. [10], [11] but also military manuals, 
produced for  the  consumption  of both  the  military them-
selves and  an  interested  public.  Virtually unknown today, 
some of these military manuals were written by highly dec-
orated and experienced officers. George Armand Furse was 
a Colonel in the Black Watch and wrote a series of books on 
such subjects as 'The Art of Marching' [7] and 'Provisioning 
Armies in  the Field'  [12]. He had served in  the Boer War 
and  had  also been Quartermaster  General  of the Nile Ex-
pedition  to  relieve  Khartoum  in  1884-1885.  Colmar 
Freiherr  von der Goltz was a Prussian  Field Marshal  who 
served in  the Franco-Prussian  War  and  later  spent  twelve 
years  helping  to  reorganise  the  Ottoman  army  after  the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. He also wrote a series of 
books based on his experiences e.g. [13], [14].
These  books often  contain  a  wealth  of information  re-
garding 18th century military organisation,  much of it  ap-
plicable to pre-modern examples. Although the invention of 
the railroad and canned food had altered military logistics,  
there were still  plenty of campaigns  away from a railway 
network and plenty of food consumed that did not come in a 
tin. The mechanisms were still there to promote war in the 
same way that it had been done since the time of Alexander  
the  Great.  People,  animals  and  goods  still  needed  to  be 
transported across unpaved roads, mules were still much in 
demand, wagons still carried heavier weights but were less 
tolerant of poor road conditions than pack animals. The ba-
sic elements were all there in the British campaigns in 18th  
century India that had been used by Alexander a little fur-
ther West, some 2,200 years before.
The extent  to which  army movement  can  be compared 
between the two periods is of course debatable.  Neverthe-
less,  where  similar  circumstances  are  mentioned  in  both 
Byzantine and 19th century military writing, the advice giv-
en is usually strikingly similar. Examples of advice common 
to  both  Byzantine  and  19th century  military  manuals  in-
clude:
•Baggage trains should be kept as small as possible.
•Civilian populations should be respected.
•A combination of supply and foraging is required.
•Soldiers should be well-fed.
•March order should be rotated.
•The route needs marking with signs or people.
•Leaders who share in the soldiers' lives are more respec-
ted.
•There is a tripartite division of baggage: Army, unit and 
personal level.
•Parties should be sent ahead to clear the road.
•Some space should be left on one side of column for loc-
al traffic or army cavalry/messengers.
•Wagons are standard but pack animals are quicker and 
should be used if speed is a factor.
•Care should be taken  over camp locations,  the criteria 
for which stays the same over time.
•In case of the column lengthening, the front should slow 
rather than the rear speed up.
•Local knowledge is very important.
This overlap between the advice of experienced military of-
ficers of the 19th century and that of the Medieval period al-
lows large amounts of new data to be included in the design 
phase of any models.  This  increases the number  of beha-
viours within the model that can be supported by historical  
data. This then reduces the parameter space that needs to be 
explored  during  the  simulation  process.  In  addition,  the 
presence of quantitative data within the 19th century manu-
als allows them to be used to validate the results of the mod-
els. Within the 19th century manuals can be found speeds of 
units and columns, weights of equipment,  capacity of bag-
gage  animals  and  the  degree  to  which  an  army  column 
lengthens  on  the  march,  all  data  absent  from  Medieval 
sources. The substantial overlap between the areas that are 
covered by sources from both periods gives confidence that 
the 19th century sources may be used as plausible supporting 
data in areas which are ignored by Medieval accounts. 
V. RESULTS
The MWGrid ABM outputs 2 text files, a dayfile and a 
tickfile. The dayfile contains one line for each agent which 




• Amount of time on the march spent resting
• Arrival time at camp
The tickfile records the location of each agent  for each 
tick of the simulation and can be very large, over 11Gb for 
40,000 agents over 12,000 ticks.  This tickfile can  be pro-
cessed by a Python script to create 2D and 3D images and 
animations  via  Blender,  the  open-source  3D  modelling 
package  [15]. The data contained in both dayfile and tick-
file can also be visualised via graphs and tables. 
In addition, data can be derived from the dayfile and tick-
file in order to produce data such as maximum and minim-
um length of an army column and the actual travel time of 
each individual  agent.  This data should not be taken as a 
direct statement of historical fact but is often more useful as 
a comparison between other runs of the simulation. For in-
stance, calories expended on the march can give an indica-
tion of any extra food that would be needed based on differ-
ent  types of march  but it  should be remembered that  this 
does not include activity before and after the march and so 
can only be used for comparative purposes.
VI. BROADER APPLICABILITY
The similarity between Byzantine and 19th century milit-
ary  writing  supports  the  hypothesis  that  while  battlefield 
tactics  can  change  quickly over  time  as  commanders  re-
spond to changing opponents, weapons and battlefields, the 
twin enemies of the logistician are distance and hunger and 
these have more stable characteristics over time. This res-
ults in a greater commonality in problems occurring over a 
larger range of time and space and consequently more sta-
bility  in  the  systems  used  to  overcome  those  problems. 
therefore the results of the MWGrid project should not only 
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interest Byzantine military historians but those interested in 
the logistics of all pre-industrial  eras and even some more 
recent campaigns in circumstances that mirror those of the 
Medieval period.
The Manzikert  campaign  was conducted as  though  the 
enemy were too far  away to be a  threat  to the  marching  
army and this, as mentioned in Byzantine military treatises,  
results in a different order of march. It presumably also al-
ters the attitudes of the campaign's  participants.  A rethink  
of the agent behaviours will be necessary if the march of an 
army near an enemy is to be modelled.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper began with a statement  that appealed for ex-
plicit  and  critical  assessments  of  simulation  models  and 
their capacity to answer the questions posed by historical re-
searchers.  It should be clear from the body of the paper that  
the MWGrid project required significant input from sources 
that  had  not  been  identified at  the  onset  of the  research.  
Whilst there is no doubt that the project was able to incor-
porate these new data it is apparent that the final output was 
not a holistic solution.  For instance, the focus of these mod-
els on distance moved and calories consumed may lead to a 
deterministic view of an army on the march. Significant ele-
ments are unmodelled however and any conclusions drawn 
from the project must take this into account. Although the 
number  of  calories  consumed  during  marching  can  be 
plausibly calculated,  the  number  consumed  before setting 
off on the march and upon arrival at camp are unknown and 
likely to vary greatly depending on circumstances. This will 
in turn affect the supply situation of the army which will in  
turn  affect movement.  However the results  of this  project 
are not our conclusions but a baseline against which we can 
measure  our  conclusions  and  the  conclusions  of  others. 
They can be an arbiter of how practical the previously un-
testable hypotheses regarding  the march  of the Byzantine 
army to Manzikert  are.  The  infrastructure  created  in  the 
MWGrid project deals with problems fundamental to army 
movement  and  supply  in  many  pre-industrial  and  some 
post-industrial  settings and can therefore be used to model 
military logistics in other times and places.
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